

*Enclosure No. 10 with Mr. Wright's
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Translation.

Hochi Shimbun,
July 8, 1907.

REAR-ADMIRAL SAKAMOTO ON THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN
BATTLESHIPS.

(Translator's Note: Rear-Admiral Sakamoto is the
Director of the Hydrographic Bureau.)

Rear-Admiral Sakamoto granted an interview to
our representative and expressed his views on the pro-
posal to dispatch a part of the U. S. Atlantic Squadron
to the Pacific. We publish the gist of his statement
on account of its timely interest.

STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES ATLANTIC
SQUADRON.

President Roosevelt is said to have announced that
16 warships belonging to the Atlantic Squadron will be
despatched to the Pacific. It is not clear whether
or not the United States means to intimidate Japan or
challenge her to a war. Suppose she has any such in-
tention, it would not be uninteresting to study the
actual strength of the Pacific and Atlantic Squadrons
of the United States. In the Atlantic Squadron, first
class armored cruisers and battleships (that is warships
whose tonnage is 10,000 or more) number 36. Of those
36, 28 are of the latest types built since 1900, and
constitute the main strength of the Atlantic defence of
the United States. Should the United States now decide
to remove from 16 to 20 of the same to the Pacific, it
may be regarded as a realization by that country of the

uselessness of a large squadron for defence on the Atlantic Coast. This is the point that interests Japan.

The Question of Naval Base.

Where will the United States have a base for such a powerful squadron? In many respects it is disadvantageous to have a naval base situated too far from points of activity. For this reason the United States will of course select an appropriate place for a base.

The Philippines?

The first place we think of in this connection is the Philippines. There is a naval station at Cavite on the Island of Luzon. A large coal depot was built there last year, while Santiago is a splendid port. On that island there is however neither a dock nor any arrangement for ship-building. In times of peace Shanghai, Hongkong etc., may be depended upon, but in war time those neutral places can not be utilized. Should Luzon be America's naval base and the Pescadores ours, Japan's squadrons will be able to act much more promptly, for the distance between the Pescadores and Cavite is only 600 knots. Thus it will be seen how disadvantageous it will be for the United States to have a naval base in the Philippines.

How About the Hawaiian Islands?

Though there is adequate accommodation in the Hawaiian Islands, the distance between the Islands and Yokohama is about 3,600 knots. Warships of today are unable to negotiate such a great distance effectively. Japan can do nothing to Hawaii any more than Hawaii can to Japan. It will thus be seen that

Hawaii has no value as a point of conflict.

No Point of Conflict.

Should hostilities unfortunately break out between Japan and the United States, there will be no point of conflict where one can win decisive victories over the other. The natural result will be to be armed and to watch each other's movements for sometime. Perhaps the United States would select San Francisco with its perfect dockyard, Mare Island with its fully equipped naval port, or Seattle with its dockyard.

Do the American People Intend
to Fight?

Even though the American Government intended to fight it is most doubtful whether the members of the American Navy would consent to fight in a spirit of pure patriotism. While the skill of the American Navy at balls and social functions does not admit of any dispute, that they at the same time pay not the slightest attention to the art of handling ships and guns is also quite certain. As the ardent patriotism of Americans is nothing but a joke, if some day war should break out between America and Japan would not most of the crews desert or resign one after another and contrive to avoid a battle? It is not easy to say.