

(Cable dictated on Steamship "Minnesota" Oct. 4th, 1907)

McIntyre

Washington.

Send following to Root if in Washington, otherwise
direct to President QUOTE

I send this cable chiefly for record but possibly
to assist in future negotiations with Japan. I reached
Yokohama on morning of September 28th; was met on the
steamer by the representative of Imperial Household with
direct invitation from Emperor to be his guest during my stay;
felt that in view of present situation could not
properly decline; accepted and went to Shiba Palace.
Called upon Minister of Foreign Affairs afternoon of
September 28th; he asked me foundation for report that
United States would sell Philippines; said that Aoki had
deemed it of sufficient importance to cable existence of
the report in the United States. I answered that there
was not the slightest foundation; that two years ago
Count Katsura had said Japan did not wish Philippines
but only that the United States retain possession and
maintain stable government there. Hayashi replied
Japan was of the same opinion today but would feel some
concern if the United States were to sell the Islands to
a European power. I said that the United States was under
obligation to Filipino people to retain Islands and lead

them on to self-government or to turn Islands over to them under a protectorate which would secure stable government. On the evening of September 28th at a dinner at Shiba Palace in the conversation with Count Tanaka, Minister of the Imperial Household and closest personal representative of the Emperor, expressed my thanks for the Emperor's hospitality; said that my visits were so frequent that I should have felt like declining it but for reports of strained relations between the two countries which I felt sure the Emperor desired to remove by his treatment of one whom he treated as the representative of the United States; that rumors of hostile intention of the United States were wholly result yellow newspapers and did not evidence the true feelings of the American Government. He subsequently advised me that he had conveyed this information to the Emperor.

On the morning of September 29th the Minister of War called. I told him Aoki had asked me to assure him that occurrences in San Francisco were local and due to bitterness of feeling not shared by country at large; said that but for the very friendly feeling which had always existed between Japan and the United States would have feared the consequences of the mistreatment of the Japanese in San Francisco. I said American Government and people could not believe war with Japan possible and that the occurrences at Vancouver B.C. showed it was impossible to control local riots growing out of labor

troubles; agreed and said that he had passed through Vancouver, B. C. ten years ago and had seen the low class of Japanese immigrants that were there and then felt that troubles might arise between them and other laborers. He said that he would report what I had said to the Prime Minister. On Saturday had a call from Methodist Bishop Harris who told me about Korea. He has forty thousand native Korean Methodists; says work of Japan in Korea makes for civilization and good government; that there are only two things that can influence Koreans to physical resistance, one is taking away their land and the other is destruction of the dynasty three thousand years old, and Ito's policy contemplates preservation of both. He said that the criticisms and reports detrimental to Ito's policy were prejudiced and grew out either of a lack of understanding or of enmity of those who had fattened on the abuses of old Korean government. Saw Durham Stevens same night. He is now under Ito in Korea. He confirmed Harris' statement; conveyed a message from Ito to me that war was impossible between Japan and United States and that he did not think there was any difference between them that could not be settled by diplomatic negotiations.

Lunched with Hayashi September 30th. He asked conference with me on the subject of immigration; he

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said that only small part of Japanese people was interested in mere question of immigration, that Japanese people would be entirely satisfied with complete restriction of immigration by treaty if it applied equally to the immigrants from all the countries, European and Asiatic; that chief interest in it was taken by syndicates who were engaged in the business of furnishing Japanese coolies for a commission; that these syndicates had influence politically and had carried on a campaign to rouse the people on the subject that this had been successful not because of any popular desire to have Japanese go to America, but because of what he called patriotic self conceit; that they bitterly resented a treaty based on inequality between Japanese and Europeans; that he had sent Ichi to examine question of immigration in the United States and Canada and was waiting for his report before formulating a policy. I said that Strauss who had seen Ichi reported to me Ichi's view that solution was a treaty giving Japanese the right to naturalize in America and reciprocally excluding laborers of each country. Hayashi answered that reciprocal exclusion was fair on its face but it was not reciprocity in fact for no American laborers came to Japan; that while right to naturalize would be welcomed as friendly concession it would not be accepted as compensation for reciprocal exclusion. Same



day I made speech at dinner of Chamber of Commerce and Municipality of Tokyo. It was telegraphed to Associated Press. Have sent copy by mail. On the whole speech has been well received by the Government, press and people and was not inopportune in view of reiterated cable dispatches as to editorials in Sun, Times and Hearst papers insisting that the fleet is sent to the Pacific to cause war and that war is inevitable. On October first had an interview with Hayashi in the presence of O'Brien and Chinda. Hayashi repeated views as to immigration and said that it was impossible in the temper of the Japanese people to consent to a reciprocal treaty of exclusion; that the only method of treating the situation was administratively through their foreign office; that they now issued no passports direct to America; that they issued a very few to Mexico and that the very serious situation in Vancouver, B. C. as to Canada made it necessary for them to take further steps to prevent additional immigration into that country; that they had it in contemplation to restrict more than heretofore the immigration to Hawaii. I said they seemed willing to restrict Japanese immigration provided it did not involve the open concession in a treaty; he said that was true. I said that it would be wise to cut off further immigration to Honolulu; that if they increased the number of Japanese workmen beyond the sixty five thousand who were now there it would probably result in an attempted reduction of wages and labor troubles, the outcome of which in view of the character



of the Japanese labor sent might have serious effect on relations between two countries; that the President thought that a treaty of reciprocal exclusion was the solution of the question and was anxious to bring it about; that it was not a question as to race distinction so much as peculiar circumstances growing out of the situation of our west coast toward Asiatic countries and that if Filipinos for instance were to come from the Philippines and work at half rates in Japan's provinces, Japan would seek their exclusion; Hayashi admitted correctness of this but repeated that it was impossible to put in treaty form such exclusion; said Japanese government would be most discreet in issuing passports; that trouble would not have arisen but for sudden demand for labor caused by earthquake and sudden influx in California of Japanese from Honolulu; said the trouble now was sentimental and danger from immigration could be met only by voluntary administrative action which would continue. I explained I had no diplomatic function or authority and all I could do was to transmit what he had said, but that it seemed to me their idea was to tide over matters and maintain the status quo with the hope that when the situation became less acute some other solution perhaps might be reached; he agreed. Same day had interviews with Count Sionji, the Premier, at his instance. He said that present government wished to reiterate Count Katsura's words of two years ago as their own in respect



of Philippines and Korea. He summed up the attitude of the government with respect to immigration by saying that they were willing to make all concessions possible except one which would admit the inequality of Japanese people with other peoples of the world. I said that the attitude of his government on this question had been properly set out to me by Count Hayashi. Same day had an interview with Count Katsura. He said that he was out of office but had friends in office and wished to preserve the peace between both countries; that the conversation which he and I had two years ago had done much to secure acquiescence in Russian peace and to maintain friendly relation between both countries in recent strain and he wished me to understand he was a friend of America and would sustain us in our purpose to continue peace. Katsura is one of the elder statesmen.

On October 2nd I was received in audience by Emperor and heard from him most friendly expressions for the President and the American people and personal expression of thanks for what I had said in speech. Just before my departure on same day had call from Count Hayashi. He said that he came rather as an individual than as foreign minister; that he was afraid subject of reciprocal exclusion of laborers by treaty had been opened by Aoki and if so he acted without authority. Chinda had before told me that they are not satisfied with Aoki as American representative. Count Hayashi said Wright had first broached the subject of reciprocal

exclusion but whether at the instance of Washington government, he did not know. I told him I thought it was, because the President was anxious if possible to secure such a treaty; that my impression was that the first suggestion of it had come from Wright in a cable to Washington as a possibility and that Strauss had reported to me that Ichi thought such a treaty possible, and that so far as I knew Aoki had not first made the proposal. Count Hayashi said that he had just learned from the Consul at Honolulu that no Japanese were going thence either to San Francisco or Vancouver, B. C.; that passports now issued for immigration to Hawaii were limited to 500 a month; that next month he would reduce it to 400 and in a short time 300.

To sum up the impressions I have received: I believe that a treaty of reciprocal exclusion at this time is impossible and I doubt the wisdom either of making the attempt or having it known. In Count Hayashi interview Chinda expressed hope that Congress would take no action looking to the exclusion of the Japanese laborers. I expressed the opinion that this would not be done in violation of treaty rights and did not think any radical action likely although the feeling on the west coast in favor of the exclusion of Japanese was strong. Am satisfied that the Japanese government is most anxious to avoid war; that they are in no financial condition to undertake it. War Minister said to Associated

Press representative there was nothing in war chest with
which to carry it on. Count Hayashi told me in respect of
Korea that many in government wish to annex Korea but
Ito objected as bad policy and the others were obliged to
yield because they could not afford to take out of
Japanese treasury ten millions yen received from the
customs revenues of Korea now collected against Japan
and all other countries.. They have their hands full
in the settlement of Korea which is more difficult than
anticipated. Their attention is centered on China.
Their army has been increased by one division, not to
fight with us but because of China; they are determined
to secure a predominance in China's affairs and to
obtain every commercial concession possible and believe
it essential to retain their armament to meet contingencies
there. One-third of their exports go to America and
commercial interests would be greatly opposed to war.
But while the government and the country's interests
are greatly opposed to war against the United States, the
people are conceited as Count Hayashi says and would
resent bitterly a concession by their own government
supposed to involve an admission of inequality with other
races. Enemies of present government would be glad to
destroy it on such an issue. Popular voice is now
so strong in Japan that the government could with difficulty
resist pressure of war by the people should the immigration

question be brought to a direct issue by Act of Congress violating treaty. Suggest therefore it is wiser to maintain status quo and secure our purpose through administrative action of Japanese State Department than by pressing for treaty. As that Department has a similar question with its ally the British government can be sure that future Japanese immigration to both countries will be reduced to lowest point. I hope this statement may assist you in what you may have to say in your annual message on the question and in making plain to California Congressmen necessity for stopping agitation and accepting the present satisfactory status quo. END OF QUOTATION.

Taft

