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[Transmission Abroad.]

The African Times.

"FOR GOD, AND GOOD TO AFRICA AND HER PEOPLE."

"Talk to me anywhere of Power, and I'll tell you of Protection. Mention a Magistrate, and the idea follows of Property. Show me any Government, and you are to see the proposed interest of those governed. Power constituted otherwise is a monster that is impossible in every system where there is any notion of the justice of God or the good of mankind."—EDMUND BURKE.

"If any Colonist suffers from injustice, whatever may be his class, his condition, or his colour, he has a right to redress at the hands of the Colonial Minister in this country."—EARL OF CARNARVON, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES, AUGUST 2, 1866.

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AFRICAN AGENCY

For Transacting Business in England for Native and other Traders on the West Coast of Africa.

IN consequence of wishes expressed from all parts of the West Coast, MR. FITZGERALD has made arrangements for selling produce consigned to him by ships to London or Liverpool; and purchasing, and shipping goods ordered against the proceeds of consignments or other effective remittances only, from either of the above ports, on a system by which the greatest possible advantage of the markets will be secured to the AFRICAN TRADER; and, as time is very important to small capitalists return goods will be sent off in all cases without any delay beyond such as may sometimes be caused by manufacturers.

All letters and bills of lading, whether the shipments be to or from London or Liverpool, to be addressed

F. FITZGERALD, Esq.,

121, Fleet-street, London, E.C.

N.B.—Open Policies on Insurance for Produce from the Coast by the Mail Steamers; but intended Shipments should be advised if possible.

MAY, 1873.

BRITISH AND AFRICAN STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY.

The splendid Steamship SENEGAL is intended to be despatched from GLASGOW on APRIL 30, 1873, and from LIVERPOOL on the 6th MAY, at 5 P.M., for Madeira, Grand Canary, Sierra Leone, Monrovia, Cape Palmas, Cape Coast Castle, Accra, Jellah Coffee, Lagos, Benin, Bonny, Fernando Po, and Old Calabar; this Steamer will also take Cargo for New Calabar, Brass, Benin, and Opobo (delivering inside the bars), the same to be transhipped at Bonny, and forwarded by branch Steamer, at Shipper's risk. GOODS will be received in GLASGOW up to 6 P.M. on the 28th APRIL, and at the Loading Berth in LIVERPOOL (North Side Coburg Dock) up to 6 P.M. on the 5th MAY. Passengers will embark by Steam Tender from Prince's Landing Stage at 4.30 P.M. on the day of sailing. Steamer sails 5 P.M.

The following departure is intended to be the Steamship VOLTA, which will leave LIVERPOOL DIRECT on the 18th MAY, at 11 A.M., for Madeira, Teneriffe, Sierra Leone, Monrovia, Cape Palmas, Half Jack, Cape Coast Castle, Accra, Jellah Coffee, Lagos, Benin, Bonny, Fernando Po, Old Calabar, and taking cargo for delivery by branch steamer inside the bars of New Calabar, Brass, Benin, and Opobo (Bathurst included). Goods will be received in Glasgow up to 6 P.M. on the 10th, and in Liverpool up to 12 Noon on the 17th. Passengers will embark at 10.30 A.M. on the day of sailing.

Goods for Sierra Leone will be landed there at Ship's expense, but Shipper's risk. All Goods while on board the Company's hulk at Bonny, to be at Shipper's or Consignee's risk.

Bills of Lading of the Company's Form can be obtained from THOMAS MURRAY and Son, 91, Buchanan-street, Glasgow; and D. MARPLES, 50B, Lord-street, Liverpool. All letters must pass through the Post-office.

For further information apply in London to Messrs. MASON, HUDSON, and Co., 5, Crosby-square; in Glasgow to TAYLOR, LATHLAND, and Co., 24, Oswald-street; and in Liverpool, to ELDON, DEMPSTER, and Co., 48, Castle-street.

Shippers are respectfully informed that Cargo can now be taken by the Steamers of the 6th and 18th for delivery inside the Bars of NEW CALABAR, BRASS, BENIN, and OPOBO. The Goods will be transhipped at Bonny, and forwarded by Branch Steamer.

WEST COAST MAIL STEAMERS.

ARRIVALS.

British and African S.N. Co.'s Senegal, April 1.
British and African S.N. Co.'s Roquelle, March 14.
African S.S. Co.'s Calabar, April 16.

DEPARTURES.

British and African S.N. Co.'s Liberia, April 6.
African S.S. Co.'s Biafra, April 12.
British and African S.N. Co.'s Congo, April 18.
African S.S. Co.'s Calabar, April 24.

WEST AFRICAN NEWS.

The British and African Steam Navigation Company's Royal mail steamship Senegal, Commander John Griffiths, arrived at Liverpool, March 31, with the mails, specie, and passengers from the West Coast of Africa.

There was little doing at Old Calabar, and at Bonny the trade had not properly opened. Under the new treaty the first oil convoy is expected down from Eboe from about the middle of April.

In order to ratify the late treaty between Bonny and Opobo, King Ja Ja of Opobo sent up to Bonny a slave, to be killed as a binding and everlasting ratification. This custom is called "chopping Ju Ju," and is most horribly cruel and revolting. The poor victim is first marked in a straight line from the crown of the head down the front of the body with a sharp knife, cutting deep into the flesh; he is then held by two or three stout fellows and chopped in two halves; his entrails are scattered out, and Ja Ja's ju-ju man, taking one-half of the body, throws it into the ebbing tide; the Bonny ju-ju man taking the other half, and doing the same. King George of Bonny endeavoured to prevent this sacrifice of human life, and offered cows or goats instead, but gross superstition still reigns paramount in this vast country. As an instance of the fearfully ignorant state of the natives on this part of the Coast, notwithstanding the number of excellent missionary establishments there, this poor man, before being sacrificed, was walking about Bonny for three or four days, quite indifferent as to his fate, though he knew it, blindly solacing himself with the idea that when he met those again who were going to kill him he would do the same to them.

On March 1 the barque Lady Wharfedale got aground on the Bonny bar, and became a total wreck, but the crew arrived at Bonny the same day, all well. After the ship was deserted the natives came down and stripped her.

The roads at Lagos were still closed, and trade was completely stagnant.

Trade on the Gold Coast was very much interfered with by the disturbance between the Ashantis and Fantis, and people were afraid to go outside the town to trade, consequently there was little or nothing doing.

His Excellency Governor, General Keate arrived at Cape Coast Castle on March 7, on his tour of inspection, and was well received.

The dispute between the Government of Bathurst, Gambia, and the Marabous was settled on March 1, and a treaty was signed, by which they become our friends and allies.

Yellow fever had entirely disappeared.

GAMBIA.

We have received copious details of the seizure and liberation on bail, of the ship Arabistan, the property of the long-established and most respectable house of T. F. Quin. It seems to us that there cannot be any possible justification of such a proceeding, which affords a new evidence in proof of the truth of the charges brought against the officials on the West Coast, in the letter of Mr. Hutton. We are sorry on such occasions that we have not more space at our command, so as to enable us to expose as it deserves official conduct so unjustifiable and pernicious.

SIERRA LEONE.

DEATH OF THE GOVERNOR-IN-CHIEF—SWEARING-IN OF THE NEW GOVERNOR-IN-CHIEF.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE AFRICAN TIMES.

Freetown, March 29, 1873.

Dear Sir,—I am sure you will be grieved to hear of the sudden death of our Governor-in-Chief, Mr. Keate. He did not arrive here from England to assume the government until the 15th of February, and died suddenly, and most unexpectedly, at Cape Coast, on the morning of the 15th March. He was buried on the evening of the same day.

On the following day, the 16th, Colonel Harley, the Administrator at Cape Coast, produced an authority to assume the Governorship-in-Chief in the event of a vacancy occurring, and was at 3 p.m., on that day, duly sworn in at Cape Coast as Governor or Administrator-in-Chief of the West African Settlements. We are glad to hear that he has recovered from his late attack of illness, and hope soon to see him installed at Government-house here, although I fear we may have to wait some time, in consequence of the Ashanti invasion, which seems likely to be a very disagreeable business. Your friend, the Rev. Henry Johnson, who has translated the New Testament into the "Mendi" language (spoken by natives up the Sherbro), will be going to England by the Calabar, which will convey his letter. This is news which, I am sure, will give you pleasure.

FREETOWN.

THE ASHANTI INVASION—THE FIRST BATTLE—3,000 KILLED AND WOUNDED.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE AFRICAN TIMES.

Cape Coast, March 12, 1873.

Sir,—1. At 10 p.m., on the 10th, we were startled by intelligence of our forces at Yankumassie, having been totally routed by the Ashantis. This report was brought down by a party of panic-stricken people belonging to this place; and it was hourly expected that we should have the enemy amongst us.

2. People were rushing to and fro in the streets of the town; some, without a moment's consideration, going to the front, only to turn back when they met large numbers of the Cape Coast people returning to town from the field of battle. This kept almost everybody on the *qui vive* till morning.

3. Day broke, and all manner of rumours were current; the Cape Coast people attributing the discomfiture of our forces to King Adoo having taken no active part in the battle, and having withdrawn his forces.

4. On the 11th, at 2 p.m., Mr. James F. Amissh arrived from the scene of action, having been dispatched by the kings and chiefs to the Government to obtain further supplies of arms and ammunition; and it was from him authentic information was first received of what had really occurred.

5. Our forces were attacked by the Ashantis about 11 a.m. on the 10th. Our position extended some three or four miles in front of Yankumassie. The key to the whole position was occupied by the Cape Coast people, and this was directly in front of the town of Yankumassie. On the right of this position were the Braffoo people, under King Edoe; the Inkoosookooms, under King Essandoh; to the left were the Abrahs, Anamaboos, Denkiras, and part of the Assins, under King Chibbo, and Inki, one of the kings of Assin, with his people. The first shot fired by the enemy was against the Abrahs, who returned the fire, and continued to fight most gallantly under their King, Anfoo Otoo. After the first volley into the Abrahs, the enemy commenced an attack on the whole line. They met a stubborn resistance, and the battle raged furiously for several hours along the whole front; the Ashantis being well led by their chiefs and captains, and our forces being no less well led by our kings, chiefs, and native gentlemen. All of a sudden, the firing in the direction of the right flank began to slacken, whilst that of the enemy had in no way abated. Mr. Amissh and others rushed to ascertain the cause, and found that a panic had seized the Cape Coast men, in consequence of it having been rumoured that the enemy had outflanked them (our forces) and got into their rear, by King Edoe having been unable to maintain his position, and having therefore withdrawn his forces from the field. Nothing would induce the Cape Coast people to remain at their post; appeals and imprecations were alike vain; their chiefs could not, and evidently would not, attempt to rally or to lead them; the enemy was in their rear, and "*Sauve qui peut*" was the cry. No attempt was made to withstand the enemy, who, by now, had made their way into their encampment; and without making a stand anywhere, they rushed to Cape Coast, bringing with them the news of the defeat of our forces.

6. But this was not the case at that time; the Abrahs, Anamaboos, and others were still fighting bravely against terrible odds, their kings and leading men each vying as to who should outdo the others in bravery. By the withdrawal of the Cape Coast people and the Inkoosookooms, and the retreat of King Edoe and people to Quaduagna, our position became open to attack from the rear, and on our right flank. The Ashantis had obtained possession of Yankumassie, and occupied the key of the position.

7. At this stage Mr. Amissh and Mr. J. M. Abadoo were sent to Lieut. Hopkins, who was supposed to be at Dunkwa, a few miles in rear of Yankumassie, to solicit him to come up to the assistance of our army with the Houssas force, and to occupy the position vacated by the Cape Coast people and Inkoosookooms. These gentlemen met Lieut. Hopkins at Quaduagna, a mile or two behind Yankumassie; informed him of the state of affairs, and prayed him to come to the aid of our people. Although Lieut. Hopkins' first impulse was to render such aid, he, however, thought it more advisable to withdraw his force gracefully from the field, and leave our people to fight it out in the best way they could. No blame must be attached to this officer for his conduct, as he acted according to his instructions. Nevertheless, it is to be regretted that a British officer should have been placed in such an equivocal and unenviable position, and should have felt bound to accept such a command under such circumstances.

8. It was now getting late in the evening; the Abrahs and Anamaboos still held out, although nearly enveloped by the enemy. The Ashantis, however, would not be refused; they pressed on, confident in their numerical superiority, and assured of victory.

9. Our forces were falling back gradually; their powder was running short, and whenever our leaders would press them on the enemy, they were met by cries for powder. To and for they

rushed, giving every encouragement by voice, gesture, and example, but it was all to no purpose; ammunition had failed them, and they had to fight their way through the enemy to Yankumassie, and retire on to Quaman, Dunkwa, Anfeldu, and adjacent villages. The retreat commenced about 7 a.m. The Ashantis took possession of our camp, but followed no further.

10. Meanwhile, as the battle was raging, the Assins, under Inki, on our extreme right, and the Denkiras and Assins, under Quarkie; Fram, and Chibbo, on our left, and who had taken but a slight share in the struggle, had stolen into the rear of the Ashanti forces, plundered their camp, and carried off a large number of prisoners—report says 2,000; but it must be an exaggeration. This accounts for the Ashantis not having followed up our retreating forces.

11. Thus ended the battle of Yankumassie. Great credit is due to Mr. Amissh, Mr. Abadoo, and others, for their conduct on the field; and Anfoo Otoo, and the King of Anamaboe, who is wounded in the thigh, deserve great praise for the example they set their people. Undoubtedly, but for the stubborn courage of the Cape Coast people, Anamaboos and Abrahs, I should have had a sad story to relate.

12. Rumours say that the Ashantis have fallen back beyond their own lines, leaving Yankumassie unoccupied. Not having as yet the returns of killed and wounded, I cannot give you the number. In a day or two I shall be in a position to do so.

13. March 14.—The report as to the number of Ashantis captured is slightly out of the way; 2,000 of them were killed and wounded in the battle, and our loss is about half of that number, the wounded on our side being about ten to one of those killed.

14. The enemy has advanced, and occupied Yankumassie and Quaduagna. Our forces are being rallied on Dunkwa, that being the only point on which a stand can be made before the enemy arrives on the coast.

15. Ackinney, King of Ackoomfi, has also arrived at Dominassi, with a large force. The Ayans, Edjimacoos, and others, are expected also in a day or two.

16. Reports that the Ashantis are making their way towards Salt Pond.

17. March 15.—Mr. Abadoo arrived here this morning, and corroborates all that Mr. Amissh stated. Queer rumours are afloat. It is reported that our Government intend, in case of our not being able to hold our own against the Ashantis, to enter into negotiations with the King of Ashanti, and to acknowledge him as the King of the Gold Coast; but will stipulate in the treaty that he shall not decapitate us at his will and pleasure as he does with his people in Ashanti, excepting in cases where his oath is broken and his laws violated; and that the Government shall be at liberty to impose duties as usual. How far this may be true, no one can say; but when we recollect that Mr. Pope Hennessy let fall certain remarks as to the expediency of the King of Ashanti having a sea-port town given him; and remember that Mr. Usher also made some remarks of a like nature; and that our present Governor-in-Chief (Mr. Keate), on the 12th instant, in the presence of Mr. Grant, Mr. Cleaver, and Mr. Amissh, argued as to the advisability of his Majesty of Ashanti having such a sea-port made over to him; and while we have also the fact of the instructions of 1869 (of which I spoke in my last), and the orders given to Lieutenant Hopkins, stating us in the face; and are brought face to face with the additional fact of the reluctance with which arms and ammunition are doled out to our forces, and the insufficiency of the quantity (for proof of which I enclose a certified copy of an order for such material) to supply an army of upwards of 30,000 men,—the man must be more than sceptical who does not give some credence to the report. This information was given us by one of our most intelligent chiefs here. I say us, for although he gave the information first to me, he repeated it in the presence of Messrs. W. E. Davison, J. A. Fynn, J. F. Amissh, J. M. Abadoo, and other educated natives.

18. If such be the intention of our Government, they will not so easily carry it into effect as they did the exchange of territories. How a Christian country like England can preach against such annexations as Savoy and Nice to France, and Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia, and yet do the very thing it remonstrates against, is more than I can comprehend, excepting that we are to take their expostulations, &c., in the same way as the preacher asked his congregation to listen to his advice, but not to act as he did—i.e., that others must not do as they do but do what they advise them to do. What is it that one of your first statesmen said on this subject of transferring the subjects of one kingdom to the dominion of another: "The wildest schemes that were ever before broached, would not go so far to shake the foundations of all established governments as this new practice. There must be in every nation a certain attachment of the people to its form of government, without which no government could exist. The system, then, of transferring the subjects of one prince to another, strikes at the foundation of every government and the existence of every nation." This was the remark made by Fox at the time

when Napoleon, in his career of conquest, created, dissolved, changed and exchanged, at his will and pleasure, some of the states of Europe. Another writer says on this very same subject, "Authority is a plant of slow growth, and, to obtain the full veneration which renders it most effectual, must have risen by degrees in the place which it overshadows and protects. Suddenly transplanted to new regions, it is apt to pine and to perish. The theoretical evils of a long-established government are generally mitigated by some practical remedy, or those who suffer by them have grown callous from habit. The reverse is the case with a newly-established domination, which has no claim to the veneration due to antiquity, and to which the subjects are attached by the strong though invisible claims of long habit." These remarks are applicable to the conduct of our Government during the last five or six years. Territories have been exchanged, cessions made, subjects transferred, with as much indifference as though they were only goods and chattels; and can it be said that in any one instance the parties thus made over were in any way consulted? Although these proceedings may eventuate in the development of the resources of our country and the amelioration of our race, can it be said that they were brought about by the free will and wishes of our people?

19. Opposition in matters not vital to us would have been madness; but to suppose that we will tacitly submit, even if the whole might of England was arrayed against us, to a sea-port town, or any part or parcel of our soil, being made over to his Majesty of Ashanti, is to labour under a delusion. We ourselves might treat with the King of Ashanti; but to think that we would acquiesce in any treaty whereby his Majesty of Ashanti would have such power over us, and that we would consent to any government whose jurisdiction has been obtained merely "by usage and sufferance," handing us over like so many bales of cotton goods, is to presume a little too far on our good nature and subservience to the powers that be.

20. That there will be an explosion of popular feeling if affairs are still to be conducted as they are, there can be no doubt; and I dare say those who are endeavouring to repress those feelings, will be the parties to be sacrificed as turbulent spirits. Should such an event occur, their acts, deeds, sayings, and writings will be adduced against them, and on such an occasion they would stand but a very miserable chance of being better dealt with than poor Gordon was. However, man proposes, but God disposes; and as no one can pierce into the dark womb of time, we must cry, "Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof."

21. March 16.—Great excitement prevails in town. It has been reported that Prince Ossoo Ansaah harbours Ashantis, some of whom come direct from the camp at Yankumassie, and others from Elmina and elsewhere; and that he is in communication with the enemy. The townspeople go over to the Prince's to ascertain the truth, and there seize upon some Ashantis, arrived but the day or night before from the Ashanti camp at Yankumassie. One being interrogated, one of them stated that after the battle at Yankumassie, the Prince—who, by the way, is an Ashanti of the Ashantis—sent one of the Ashantis concealed in his quarters to advise the Commander-in-Chief of the Ashanti army to advance without delay, as our forces were panic-struck and were scattered about the country, and that this messenger of the Prince's returned with twelve men, who were sent to carry up to the enemy a supply of powder, and that they succeeded in carrying off this supply, and that he and his other friends were also sent down to the Prince to purchase them more powder, and that they would have left that night for the Ashanti camp with what the Prince had obtained for them, had they not been just seized upon. Another of them, who has been residing here some time, also stated that the Prince sent him to buy powder for these people and others, and that it was no doing of his, as he was bound to obey the Prince.

22. This so exasperated the people that they would have plundered and pulled down the Prince's house, had not the Government sent the Inspector of Police with a body of Houssas to protect the Prince and his property. His Royal Highness now has lodgings provided for him in the castle. Rumours say that he was suspected by the Government of treachery or treason so far back as in December last, and that in consequence his grant from the Queen has been suspended till Her Majesty's pleasure is made known.

23. March 17.—Our Governor-in-Chief, Mr. Keate, died this morning at 5.30, and was buried at the same hour in the evening. It is said that our Administrator, Colonel Harley, has a dormant commission as Administrator-in-Chief; how far this is true, to-morrow we shall know.

24. March 18.—Reported that the enemy is still advancing, and that our forces are not in a position to meet him.

25. A circular was issued to the effect that Colonel Harley would be sworn in as Administrator-in-Chief at 3 p.m.; and he has been sworn in as such.

26. One of the companies here (the Inkooms, I believe)

purchased some powder from Mr. Cleaver; and as all the powder in town is in the magazine in the castle, he gave them an order, or requisition, for the quantity they required. They took the order to the party in charge of the magazine, and he issued out to them damaged powder; and although they protested against this, and Mr. Cleaver remonstrated against it, the Government refused to give other than damaged powder to them, alleging as their reason that damaged powder is more dangerous than what is not damaged; and that they will not issue, for that reason, any other than damaged powder till what there is of it has been cleared out of the magazine. Mind, the powder belongs to the merchants, and is not Government property. This occurred yesterday, and up to the time I write the affair is still *in statu quo*. I leave this with the remark, that the conduct of the parties concerned is criminal in the present state of things, when the enemy is but fifteen or sixteen miles from this; and when they know that the company requires the powder for the purpose of combating the enemy.

27. March 19.—The Housa force, under Lieutenant Hopkins, have again gone to the front. This time, I suppose, to fight the Fantis and not the Ashantis; for I do not see for what purpose they are going up, if, on hearing the enemy's shot, they are instructed to turn round and skedaddle.

28. Messengers from the camp at Dunkwa have just arrived. They have been dispatched to Messrs. Davidson, Amisshah, and myself, to call upon Mrs. Barnes and Mrs. Swanzy to solicit them to urge on the Cape Coast people to march to the camp at once, as, from the information they obtained from an Ashanti that was captured on the 16th, the King of Ashanti himself is expected to come to reinforce his army with a still larger body of troops, and that he is daily expected to arrive, as messengers were sent up to him immediately after the battle of Yankumassie to inform him of the victory gained by his army, and to pray for reinforcement, as they had suffered severely. Our people, therefore, want to make an attack on the Ashanti position before his Majesty arrives on the scene of action. A few hours or days will decide the fate of the protectorate. Heaven grant that we may defeat the machinations of our enemies, and the perfidy of our friends!

29. I have omitted to state that the kings and chiefs in the camp at Dunkwa sent down on Friday last to ascertain from the Government what assistance it would render us in the present crisis; and after having promised aid in general terms, our Administrator asked, *what had become of the Fanti Confederation—why did they not look to it for support? And what was it doing?*

30. That remarks so impolitic should have fallen from the lips of one so high in authority, is to be deplored; for he could not plead nor pretend ignorance of the causes that had led to the inaction, if such it can be termed, of that institution; and it looks as if the Government purposely nipped in the bud the attempts of our people at self-government, so that it might deride them when opportunity offered. They may be sure that their actions are closely watched, and will be made public to the whole world, so long as we have health, life, strength, and energy left.

31. Mr. Davidson and other "Confederation conspirators" leave for the seat of war to-morrow.

32. Report says that the Ashantis who were seized at Prince Anshah's residence have been decapitated. It is a pity such should be the case, as they would have furnished evidence for prosecuting the Prince.

33. The merchants here have addressed a letter to Colonel Harley, suggesting that our forces at Dunkwa be supplied with at least 300 barrels of powder, which would give each man sixty rounds. How far this suggestion may be acted upon here is no knowing; but there can be no doubt that our forces had to give way before the Ashantis at Yankumassie for want of powder, and the same will occur again unless they are sufficiently provided.—I am, Sir, yours truly,

J. H. BAEW.

THE NATIVE LADIES OF CAPE COAST SUBSCRIBING TO BUY ARMS AND POWDER, ETC.

COPY OF CIRCULAR.

To the Foreign Ladies and Gentlemen residing in Cape Coast.

Cape Coast, March 13, 1873.
Dear Friends,—News having been received from the camp of the rapid advance of the Ashanti forces invading the Protectorate territories, and it being imperatively necessary that speedy and material measures be adopted for repelling the invasion, the native ladies of Cape Coast have resolved on levying among themselves contributions for the purchase of arms and munitions of war, in order to aid the fighting-men in retaking the field against the enemy; and therefore beg to call on the foreign ladies and gentlemen residing here to lend their pecuniary assistance according to their ability.

MARY BARNES, ELIZ. WALDRON,
KATE SWANZY,
For the Native Females of Cape Coast.

P.S.—The collection has exceeded 150*l*. sterling. We have come to a pretty pitch when the ladies are obliged to levy contributions for the war! Are the gentlemen in Downing-street aware of this? The Ashantis are within six hours' march of Cape Coast, over 30,000 strong.

LIST OF PASSENGERS PER STEAMSHIP SENEGAL.

Mr. D. Ballie, A. Bell, and Captain Gaade, from Fernando Po; Captain Diaper, Bonny; Revs. Mr. Courdiox, and Mr. Cloud, Lagos; Mr. E. Hilton, Sierra Leone; S. Smith, Tenerife; Mr. Mrs. and Miss Geoghegan, Madeira.

TRUE STATEMENTS OF THE CAUSE OF LAGOS DISASTERS.—No. I.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE AFRICAN TIMES.

Lagos, March 13, 1873.

Sir,—Our attention here has been called to several articles in the *Manchester Courier* since November 5th, 1872, and statements made before the Chamber of Commerce by Mr. Charles Leigh Clare, of Manchester, in the interests of Captain Glover, the late mis-Administrator of Lagos. We cannot allow these assertions to pass uncontradicted; otherwise the authorities in Downing-street and the English people would think that they are true, as silence in such a crisis would seem to show consent. Captain Glover has been used to scribble laudable reports of his own acts, and draw excellent maps of Lagos and the interior, including the so-called new road (where Mr. Goldsworthy was nearly killed by the Igbo-beim bush people, and whence several of the carriers had to run away back to Lagos), to suit his own purpose of warfare and the destruction of nations, and not for lawful trade, as proved by the intercepted letters at Abeokuta from the chief Kakaranfo, of Ibadan, to Captain Glover and his counsellors, Isaac (the ex-head Olokpa of Lagos), Lemoran, Majeji, Shitte, Abamba, Abay-ade, and the Mahomedan young men, for the destruction of Abeokuta and Ijebu), which were published in the *African Times* of June 24th, 1872. Now, Mr. Editor, mark what followed. The principal chief of Ibadan at the time disapproved of this wicked plot, and refused to carry out these evil designs. This chief's name is "Ajoboh." The "Gloverite" Ibadans conspired to assassinate him. Getting a hint of it, he fled to the kingdom of Jebu, and is still living at Ipara under the protection of the King of Jebu. What a lesson to Captain Glover and Mr. Charles Leigh Clare from a heathen chief!

Mis-Administrator Glover, after this sent a letter to an Egba chief, in his own handwriting, but without date or signature (copy of which was handed to Governor Hennessy at the interview with his Excellency and Captain Glover at Government-house, Lagos, ere he took the sham leave of absence, and which he never denied; and which also appeared in the *African Times*, June 24th, 1872), as follows:—"Open the roads through Abeokuta and Jebu; let guns, powder, &c., go to the interior, and guns, powder, &c., shall be free to-morrow. If the enemies to both Lagos and Abeokuta alike wish to spoil the new roads—Koro, Ondo, and Ifa—open the Abeokuta and Jebu roads; keep them closed, and the new road will quickly become developed." Mr. Editor, we ask, what had Captain Glover to do with the internal arrangements of the interior people? The Egbas and Jebus never closed their roads against the Ibadans for goods, rum, hoop-iron, &c., and produce—only for ammunition; and that was at the request of all the interior kings and chiefs, including the King of Oyo, their master, because the Ibadans don't care about lawful trade, but only for war, kidnapping, and committing raids—their king being unable to control them. We maintain, then, that, so long as we get produce and sell off our goods, Captain Glover had no right to be a busybody in the internal arrangements of foreign countries. Captain Glover unlawfully secured secretly for about two years to break the internal arrangements (although trade in goods and produce was going on), and, not being successful, he tried all he could to separate the Jebus and Egbas under false pretences, for their destruction. Not being successful in this, he, in September, 1871, prohibited the sale of ammunition, knives, hoop-iron, nails, &c., to the Jebus and Egbas, and forced Mr. Goldsworthy to go on April 12th, 1872, through bushes and jungles which he calls the new road, to enable him to plead that because he is opening a new road the Egbas and Jebus got jealous, and closed theirs. The roads and markets were closed 18th March, 1872. Goldsworthy left Lagos April 12th, 1872, to open a stupid route (it is no road at all, as will be seen by his own letter). Governor Hennessy landed at Lagos April 25th, 1872; left for Cape Coast April 30th; returned to Lagos 12th June, 1872; therefore, Mr. Clare, Governor Hennessy did not close the roads.

The Government of Lagos, we learn, are in possession of a letter written by Mr. Goldsworthy, dated near Ibadan, June 13th, 1872, addressed to Administrator Glover, in which Mr. Glover's

messenger thus describes his interview with the Chief of Ibadan: "He begged me to ask you if things were not ripe for the destruction of the E's and J's (Egbas and Jebus) as nations. Bide your time, not to put him to shame. Better wait than commence before you are prepared." Now, Mr. Clare, you see Glover sent Goldsworthy on account of war, and not for trade.

Well, Mr. Editor, Mr. Goldsworthy, no doubt, thought he would be made a C.B. for his successful mission of war, and be appointed Governor of somewhere or other! Mr. C. D. Turton, agent to Mr. Clare in Lagos, who has been under several masters in Lagos as clerk and agent for the last fifteen years, till he comes finally under Charles Leigh Clare, the other day, accompanied Goldsworthy as far as Makun, a Jebu town bordering on the river, and thought, it is said, that he would be made Colonial Secretary of Lagos by Captain Glover. Hence, we suppose, the misrepresentations fathered by Mr. Clare before the Chamber of Commerce. His employer, Mr. Clare, had, it is affirmed, arranged a Government loan with mis-Administrator Glover, of Lagos. Captain Glover, it is said, undertook to run this Government into a debt of 50,000*l*., the proceeds of which he was willing to spend at Lagos. This was to be manipulated at Manchester by Mr. Clare. It is, indeed, no secret. Mr. Clare, writing to Glover, on October 24th, 1871, says, "We could at once place the entire amount at your disposal, at 7 per cent. interest and 4 per cent. sinking fund; or, in other words, you would have to reserve out of Lagos revenue an annual sum of 4,500*l*., or thereabouts, to pay interest and extinguish the loan in fifteen or sixteen years. Our commission would be 3 per cent. on the amount of the loan." We say, Mr. Editor, for fifteen years the Treasury of Lagos was to transmit 4,500*l*. a-year to Manchester until the loan was paid off; so that Mr. Clare was to have the handling of 67,500*l*. of the Lagos finances. Governor Kennedy and Hennessy respectively refused to sanction it. Sir Arthur even said, dryly, "Captain Glover is a very funny financier." Being thus deprived, and Governor Hennessy having sent away Captain Glover, Mr. Clare must naturally have felt that Governor Hennessy had committed an irreparable injury. This has made him, no doubt, unconsciously accessible to misrepresentations in England. The Rev. E. Roper, who, it is reported here, went to the Colonial-office with Mr. Clare and others, was, we believe, to be made Colonial Chaplain at Lagos by Captain Glover. Is it any wonder, Mr. Editor, that all these persons—Mr. Clare, Mr. Turton, Mr. Goldsworthy, Mr. Roper, &c.—should be trying to get back Captain Glover to Lagos?

We in Lagos don't thank Mr. Clare and his friends for all their gross misrepresentations which, we feel sure, Mr. Clare will himself be sorry for when his eyes shall be opened to the truth. These are all matters of bargain and trade, and gain, caused by what the natives call *ofu kokoro*—i.e., covetous eyes. Those who have been accustomed to feast on the Lagos revenue still set their eyes upon it, and therefore desire and labour hard to get the Captain back, that the squandering may go on to their benefit. Whatever may be said of Governor Pope Hennessy, he has done well during his short administration. Whatever may be his creed, it was not he who caused the roads to be closed. Mr. Editor, does Mr. Clare never read the *African Times*, especially since 1871? If he had done so, he would have escaped being misled as he has been; unless it be that the Manchester loan business has unconsciously blinded his eyes to facts.

Mr. Editor, please publish all these facts for the information of Lord Kimberley, Mr. Hugessen, and other authorities in Downing-street, and also for all the Members of Parliament during their session, so that they may be able to refute Mr. Jacob Bright for Chas. Leigh Clare and Co., and all the clique of the Gloverians.

We hope, ere this reaches you, the roads will be opened. The people are, we think, perfectly satisfied now, that Captain Glover is not coming out again.—Your obedient servant,

AFRICA.

(For Letter No. 2 see p. 121.)

EAST AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE MISSION.

MOMBASA, March 28.—H.M.S. Enchantress, with Sir Bartle Frere on board, escorted by the Daphne, left here to-day for Muscat and Bombay. Sir Bartle Frere hopes to arrive at the latter place at the end of April. All well on board.

OFFICIAL GAZETTE, APRIL 8.

FOREIGN-OFFICE, April 5.—The Queen has been graciously pleased to appoint George Hartley, Esq., now Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Louanda, to be Her Majesty's Vice-Consul for the Districts comprised between the Northern Limits of the Province of Angola and Black Point, including the River Congo, to reside at Louanda.

LIVERPOOL MARKETS.

MARCH 23 to 30.

EBONY.—Fine Old Calabar, 12 tons at 16*l*. per ton. PALM OIL in continued good demand, at a further improvement in prices, and 700 tons sold on the spot and to arrive; Irregular at 28*l*. to 35*l*. 10s., Bonny at 35*l*., Cameroons at 35*l*. 7s. 6d., Benin at 35*l*. 15s., Old Calabar at 35*l*. 15s. to 36*l*., New Calabar at 38*l*. to 38*l*. 5s., and Brass at 38*l*. 15s. per ton. COTTON in much better demand, with firm prices. Sales of the week, 8,903 bales; price, Lagos quality, 3*d*. to 7*d*.

MARCH 29 to APRIL 5.

GINGER.—370 bags, African, at 46s. 9d. to 47s. per cwt. PALM OIL.—Market very steady, and 800 tons sold on the spot and to arrive; Bonny at 35*l*. to 35*l*. 5s., Benin at 35*l*. 15s. to 36*l*., Old Calabar at 36*l*., Lagos at 37*l*. 10s., and Accra, Salt Pond, Winnebush, and other Irregular at 34*l*. 10s. to 36*l*. per ton. COTTON.—Market firmer, prices unchanged. Sales of the week 91,000 bales; Lagos qualities, 6*d*. to 7*d*.

APRIL 5 to APRIL 12.

EBONY.—8 tons, Old Calabar, 9*l*. to 14*l*. per ton. PALM KERNELS.—64 tons and 363 bags, at 13*l*. 10s. per ton. BENNET SEED.—21 bags at 56s. 6d. per quarter. COPRAH.—300 bags at 17*l*. to 17*l*. 10s. per ton. GROUND NUTS.—82 bags, in shell, at 11*l*. and 227 bags, decorticated, 16*l*. to 16*l*. 10s. per ton.

PALM OIL.—Supply very small, and trade quite a retail one. COTTON.—Fair demand, but there being ready sellers, prices show a slight decline. Sales during the week, 55,000 bales.

APRIL 12 to APRIL 19.

EBONY.—12 tons Old Calabar—inferior, 7*l*.; common, 10*l*. PALM OIL.—500 tons sold on the spot and to arrive. Bonny 35*l*. 5s., Benin 35*l*. 15s., Old Calabar 36*l*., New Calabar 38*l*. COTTON.—Ample supply. Prices barely maintained. Sales of the week, 52,000 bales. Price, Lagos quality as before.

APRIL 19 to APRIL 26.

GROUND NUTS.—50 bags African, 15*l*. 10s. per ton. PALM KERNELS.—410 bags and 55 tons, 13*l*. to 13*l*. 5s. per ton. PALM OIL.—Palm oil in good request, at steady prices, and 750 tons sold; Irregular at 28*l*. to 34*l*., Accra at 35*l*., Bonny at 36*l*. 5s., Benin at 35*l*. 15s., Old Calabar at 36*l*., Lagos at 37*l*. 10s., and New Calabar at 37*l*. 15s. per ton. COTTON.—A decline in most descriptions.

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.

HOUSE OF COMMONS, APRIL 25, 1873.

QUESTIONS.

Mr. M^rArthur.—To ask what steps government have taken to repel the Ashantee invasion of the protected territories on the Gold Coast.

Sir J. Hay.—To ask whether Government have any authentic information of the defeat of the forces of the British protectorate on the Gold Coast by the Ashantee Army: and what steps are taken to resist the invasion and to protect the British settlements at Cape Coast Castle.

Sir T. Bazley.—To ask for information as to the commerce and defence of Lagos.

Mr. KNATCHBULL-HUGHESSEN, in reply to the questions by Mr. M^rArthur and Sir John Hay, stated that the last account respecting the Ashantee invasion was that there had been an engagement with the invading army about 30 miles from Cape Coast Castle, which terminated in favour of the invaders, but that they had suffered considerably, and had not made any further advance. A reinforcement of 100 men of the 2d West India Regiment had arrived, and 150 mounted police had been sent to the Gold Coast. Colonel Hardy had taken every possible means to unite and combine the forces for the purpose of defence. Arms and ammunition had been sent, together with large supplies of provisions, and two ships of war were now acting on the coast, and some paddle steamers had been sent out, well provisioned.

Mr. KNATCHBULL-HUGHESSEN, in reply to Sir T. Bazley, said he was aware that from existing disruptions at Lagos and on the neighbouring continent the commerce of those districts had greatly diminished: but the last accounts received at the Custom-house, showed that zeal and activity were alone necessary to render the district flourishing. With respect to any early restoration of the means of resuming business, it was difficult to form any sanguine expectation when dealing with savage tribes. With regard to the state of Lagos, one hundred and fifty troops had been sent to the Gold Coast, and a ship of war had also been sent there. With respect to the report of the persecution of the negroes who had taken refuge in Lagos, a careful inquiry had been instituted, and it appeared that the complaints had been greatly exaggerated, although they were not altogether without foundation. The Government had issued stringent orders, with regard not only to Lagos but to every other part of Her Majesty's dominions, that British territory should be always treated as free to all slaves who might apply to it for refuge.

SPECIAL NOTICE.

Commencing with May Number, we resume publication of the "African Times" on the 23rd of each Month, instead of the 29th, as recently.

The African Times.

PUBLISHED MONTHLY. PRICE 5d., STAMPED.

You are earnestly requested to allow your name to be added to the list of yearly subscribers. Price 5s. per annum for each copy, payable in advance.

The African Times.

TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 1873.

CHILD, HORNBY, AND CO., LIMITED.

COMMUNICATIONS having been received from Messrs. Child, Mills, and Co., that the above-mentioned company will not be proceeded with, the announced article is withdrawn. —Ed. *African Times*.

COLONEL HARLEY, ADMINISTRATOR-IN-CHIEF.

THE West Coast Settlements have escaped a great calamity. In the actual state of affairs there, the sudden and lamented death of Mr. Keate, only one month after his arrival at Sierra Leone as Administrator-in-Chief, might have been attended with most serious consequences, had that death been followed by an interregnum. But, thanks to a wise prevision on the part of Earl Kimberley, to whatever it may have been owing, that added danger has been avoided by Colonel Harley, Administrator at Cape Coast, being in possession of the requisite authority so to do, and immediately assuming the office of Administrator-in-Chief. By the tenor of the latest news, there seems to have been reasonable grounds for the belief that, owing to a conviction on the part of the native authorities of there being no longer any danger of Captain Glover being entrusted with any office that would give him power as regards the affairs of Lagos, the roads and markets on which the trade of Lagos depends, would be speedily re-opened. Any delay in the appointment of a successor to the late Mr. Keate might have upset all this. The adherents of Captain Glover in Lagos would have been immediately busy in circulating news of an approaching appointment of Captain Glover to the Governorship-in-Chief. Any previous determination of the native authorities to re-open trade with Lagos, would then certainly have been rescinded. The disastrous state of affairs which has existed for now thirteen months would then have been infinitely prolonged, to the entire ruin of everybody connected with the trade and commerce of Lagos. We therefore repeat our sincere thanks to Earl Kimberley for having, by his prevision in this matter, averted so great an extension of this evil.

STATE OF AFFAIRS AT CAPE COAST.

MR. BREW's letter, which we now publish is deeply interesting. It describes fully the serious very state of affairs at Cape Coast, with a victorious Ashanti enemy only some fifteen miles distant from open unprotected coast towns. The Fanti fought well at Yankumassie; so well as to fully justify our before expressed convictions, that if Her Majesty's Government had adopted and supported the Fanti Confederation, the evils that have now fallen upon the Protectorate could not have occurred. We await further intelligence with a most painful anxiety, because we have no confidence in Her Majesty's Government doing anything more than to defend Cape Coast Castle, Elmina Castle, and other fortified points, if attacked. Hitherto the Government forces have studiously avoided all collision with the Ashantis; the supplies of arms and ammunition had been very inadequate; and in view of observations made from time to time by Administrators, as to the advisability of giving to the Ashantis—the mortal enemies of Fanti—a town on the Fanti sea board, we cannot wonder at the suspicions mentioned by Mr. Brew; although we will not for a moment believe it possible that the Government could ever be

guilty of an atrocity which would brand Great Britain with infamy. The Fanti must continue the struggle until not one hostile Ashanti remain alive on the Fanti side of the River Prah.

OUR LAGOS LETTERS.

It was not to be expected that the statement on Lagos affairs made by Mr. Charles Leigh Clare before the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, would be allowed to pass without remark by our Lagos friends. The two letters (pp. 116 and 121) are the Lagos replies. We have not space for any comment, nor do we see that they require it. The one fact on which we have always insisted stands out clear and strong. All the evils that have fallen on Lagos are the results of Captain Glover's most unfortunate and unjustifiable policy; they have been prolonged by the reports constantly circulated among the natives by his adherents—expectant office-bearers under him, that he would return to Lagos as Administrator; or go to Sierra Leone as Administrator in Chief, which would give him supreme control over Lagos affairs; and they will only cease when the native authorities of Egba, Jebu, &c., are satisfied that there cannot possibly be any further interference of Captain Glover in their affairs. As to the loan secured on the revenues of Lagos, which one of these letters states that Captain Glover was desirous of raising through the instrumentality of Mr. Clare, we merely give our opinion that there could not be a more emphatic condemnation of Captain Glover's administration than the supposed necessity for raising such a loan. With a revenue of 40,000l. a year, with no real necessity for any defensive arrangements involving expense, it was simply monstrous that there should have been an empty treasury at Lagos. Loans on the security of the revenues of West African Settlements ought not to be raised except for some well-defined object; simply to bolster up a lavish and wanton official expenditure, they are utterly indefensible.

MR. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN ON CAPE COAST AND LAGOS AFFAIRS.

MR. HUGESSEN's replies to questions by Mr. Alderman M'Arthur, Sir John Hay, and Sir Thomas Bazley, call imperatively for a few comments. The hundred men of the 2nd West India Regiment and 150 Houssas (Mahometan policemen from Lagos, and not Hussars, as seems to have been understood in the House of Commons) could only be available for the defence of Elmina and Cape Coast Castle, to the latter of which Colonel Harley, the Administrator-in-Chief, had by our latest advices judiciously retired. Colonel Harley had nothing to do with the union and combination of the native kings and chiefs for defence. The King of Mankessim's letter to Colonel Harley, published in our last, shows that the kings and chiefs were ready to do all that was in their power if they could obtain adequate supplies of arms and ammunition; and we rejoice to have Mr. Hugessen's public assurance that "arms, ammunition, and large supplies of provisions of war (not two) off Cape Coast; but as the range of their guns does not exceed three or four miles, they could only serve as supports to the land fortifications, Cape Coast and Elmina Castles, &c., and as possible refuge for ruined and plundered merchants and traders, should the Ashantis enter into and sack the coast towns, which seems unhappily but too probable. Viewed in the light of Mr. Brew's letter, Mr. Hugessen's remarks leave on our mind a very sad impression, as we shall explain hereafter. We confess we do not understand what Mr. Hugessen means, when he states with regard to "Lagos," "that zeal and activity are alone necessary to render the district flourishing." This looks very like an insult to men who have been ruined through Earl Kimberley's deplorable error, and the evil use made of it by Administrator Glover. Mr. Hugessen says, that by "last accounts considerable sums had been received at the Custom House," but he forgot to state or did not know, that the goods, on which the duties thus received had been paid, were lying unsaleable at Lagos until the roads and markets should be re-opened; in hope and anticipation of

which event they had been sent out. The public refutation of the exaggerated charges as to interference with refugee slaves, made by Mr. C. L. Clare and other friends of Captain Glover, is satisfactory, and fully bears out the statements of our correspondents. Want of space compels us to postpone further remarks until our next number.

WEST AFRICAN GOVERNMENT—MR. HUTTON'S LETTER.

Will it be any new light to the British officials on the West Coast of Africa, and to the Colonial-office authorities, that their system (if there be such a thing as system in it) of West Coast government is regarded by competent persons, other than the Editor of the *African Times*, as open to great reproach? We have been denounced by Governors and Administrators, and, as natural accompaniment, by the whole official pack on the Coast down to the very lowest grade, as an incendiary, lying, calumniating fault-finder, because we could not discern the local official wisdom and purity; nor see in the Colonial-office rule that careful regard to the interests of the West Coast Settlements, their people, and their trade, which their growing importance ought to obtain for them. Mr. Hutton writes that he has been urged to make to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce that *expose* of West African misgovernment, and its ruinous results, which we reproduce in our present number. We cannot endorse all the complaints, facts, and arguments in his letter; but everything important and vital in it has been, month after month, exposed, advocated, or urged in our columns. It cannot be denied by anyone who is at all acquainted with the condition of affairs in the British West African Settlements, that the grossest misgovernment has prevailed, and that the evil results are now of such magnitude as to require immediate attention on the part of Her Majesty's Government, if they have any desire to avert the ruin that is now running riot there. It is, unhappily, the fashion, now that a foreign slave trade no longer exists, to pooh-pooh West Africa, as scarcely worth a moment's thought or care. The Manchester Chamber of Commerce seems to be imbued with this contempt for West African insignificance, if we may judge by the cold shoulder they have turned on Mr. Hutton. China, Japan, our East Indian possessions, and North and South Atlantic Colonies, which receive their tens of millions of pounds sterling of Manchester goods, cast poor West Africa into deep shade. A little feeling of interest for her was aroused there at the time when civil war in the United States of America interfered with a due supply of cotton; and West Africa was looked to as possessing capabilities for producing the coveted staple. But as Rome was not built in a day, so neither could a large cotton cultivation for export be at a wish inaugurated in the West African Settlements; although something was done, and the production of cotton is constantly on the increase. It is now, no doubt, wearisome to be called upon to occupy the precious time of the Chamber of Commerce with the paltry affairs of countries importing a mere million's worth of the products of the Manchester looms. Either this, or Mr. Leigh Clare had monopolized the ear of the Chamber for the erring official who has sown ruin broadcast among the traders of Lagos. We hope, however, that Mr. Hutton will persevere, although, as above stated, we cannot endorse all that he writes; or the inference of the *Manchester Courier*, that the "present Administration" (Mr. Gladstone's) is worse than its Tory predecessors in its treatment of West Africa. Where could a more staunch supporter be found in the House of Commons of African Governmental abuses and official misrule in West Africa than Sir Charles Adderley? And was he not also one of the warmest advocates of the proposed cession of the Gambia to France? Could it be possible for any Secretary of State to throw a broader shield over official profligacy and judicial tyranny than was held by the Duke of Buckingham before the official culprits at Sierra Leone, Cape Coast, and Accra? No; nothing is to be gained for the West African Settlements by efforts to identify their interests with this or that political party in Great Britain. The evil traditions of the Colonial-office descend from Administration to Administration—from Tory to Liberal, and Liberal to Tory. It is these traditions, the evil system of

official appointments, and inveterate defence of official incapacity and misdoing, that we have to combat and destroy. These lie at the very root of all the ruinous error, the abuse of power, the profligacy, and official contempt for the Africans, that characterise our rule on the West Coast. Against these we have always waged war, and shall wage war so long as God may continue to us the power to do so; and we hail Mr. Hutton's appearance on the scene of combat with unfeigned delight.

THE BONNY "RATIFICATION OF PEACE" TRAGEDY.

LOATHING, horror, indignation, pity, and shame fill our hearts as we read the short but terribly graphic account of human sacrifice at Bonny.* The dark parts of the earth are indeed full of the habitations of cruelty. We never felt our duty as regards West Africa so heavy upon us as at this time, in view of a superstitious enormity so appalling. It is now between thirty and forty years since the foreign slave traders were finally expelled from Bonny. Legitimate commerce took the place of the former infamous traffic. The oil trade increased rapidly. The Eboe country from which it is brought to Bonny is capable of an unlimited supply of palm oil. Trading hulks, belonging to Liverpool merchants, were stationed in the river; trading ships from England came and went in quick succession, and for now many years, one, two, three, four, or five mail steamers per month have called there both on the outward and homeward voyage. And yet, in 1873, without cloak or concealment, openly and ostentatiously, a devoted human victim is paraded about Bonny for three or four days, to be finally butchered and disposed of in so hideously disgusting a way, that the blood chills in the veins as imagination realizes the scene of fiendish sacrifice. The icy chill of loathing, horror, and disgust is followed by the warm emotion of pity and the burning thrill of indignation and shame. Who would not pity the poor victim, who meets what he knows to be his inevitable doom with a resignation and fortitude that would have immortalized him in Greek or Roman history? He is dead; the ebbing tide received the mangled remains of what but now was the habitation of an immortal soul. We have done with him; he is past all help. But now our duty begins. Was there no eye to pity? Was there no hand stretched forth to save? We are glad to record that, for the honour of humanity, there was such pity and such effort; although, alas! they were without avail. King George Pepple, of Bonny, so states the report, exerted all the power and influence he possessed to save the destined victim. He offered all that he could offer to redeem him. It does not detract from his merit that a beastly superstition prevailed against him; that it would not accept as substitutes any of the inferior animal creation; that it would have its human victim. Of this more anon, though we cannot pass on without thanking God that he, at least, is guiltless of the blood of that man. Who, then, is guilty of it? Primarily Ja Ja, formerly a chief of Bonny, but now, thanks to successful rebellion—successful because supported by some interested British merchants—now King Ja Ja, of Opobo. We confess that, in our indignation, we would sweep this Ja Ja and his newly-established title from the face of the earth. Here, however, we foresee the remark, "Why this indignation? Is this a new thing in West Africa? Instead of one victim, are there not hundreds and thousands of human victims yearly sacrificed with equal atrocity in Dahomey and Ashanti? Why not preach a crusade against the kings and the superstitions of those countries?" The reply is not far to seek. We are not without pity and indignation for the poor wretches slaughtered in the thoroughfares of Comassie, and at the bloody customs of Abomey. But there the iniquity is for the present beyond our reach. It could not be got at by the arm of British power without a certain expenditure of human life, which we are not prepared to advocate or justify. But the case is widely different as regards Ja Ja, Opobo, and Bonny. He and they are accessible to British influence and power. This human victim was offered by Ja Ja as a

* See West African News, p. 114.

ratification of a treaty between him and his former superior, the King of Bonny—a treaty negotiated and arranged by a British commodore and consul—by which Great Britain for the first time acknowledged him as a king; and by which, also, his trading town is to be near the mouth of the Opobo, so that he may always be within reach of a British ship-of-war. Under such circumstances, we feel as if Great Britain was answerable for the death of that poor slave. For many reasons. If (at least, so we have always contended) Her Majesty's Government had fulfilled its moral obligations with Bonny, it would have brought Ja Ja back to that place when first he established himself up the river, and intercepted the communications between the oil districts and Bonny. Owing to its nonfulfilment of the obligation, Ja Ja became a power. Next, it acknowledges him as such; and one of his first acts after this recognition is to offer up that human sacrifice, with the consummation of which, so far as our present intelligence goes, no one interfered, as opposing it, but only King George Pepple. Is it not natural we should ask, where was the British Consul? Had he no knowledge of the fiendish atrocity about to be committed? Why did he not forbid it? And again, was no effort made by the British mercantile agents to obtain possession of that doomed victim? It seems to us that Her Majesty's Government must demand of Mr. Consul Livingston a full explanation of his conduct in permitting such an outrage to humanity, as an act of ratification of a treaty which he, with Commodore Commerel, had imposed on the Opobo and Bonny contendants. The treaty, Ja Ja, the poor victim, and Consul Livingston, are all mixed up together, in our eyes; nor can we separate Consul Livingston, and, as a consequence, Great Britain, from the others, until it be shown beyond dispute that the Consul did not know, and could not have known, that such an atrocious act was about to be committed. But even though it be proved that the Consul did not know, and could not have known, of the intended butchery, so as to have enabled him to interfere with a British prohibition, we shall still feel that we cannot get rid of our national responsibility in the matter. We have been verily guilty in Bonny affairs. If we had cared any longer as a nation for anything beyond mere trade and its profits—if we had cared, as we once did, about the spread of Christian civilization among heathen people—we should have given a steady and uniform support to King George Pepple. We do not know whether he professes to be a Christian; but he represents, and has always represented, Christian civilization, as against a most bloody, superstitious heathenism at Bonny. In this is the real cause of his weakness as regards his chiefs and people; in this is the real cause of the Ja Ja separation from Bonny. King George has assisted and protected missionary efforts at Bonny. Educated, with his brothers Charles and Henry, in England, he is thoroughly imbued with English ideas, and has consequently inherited the suspicion and dislike which attached to his father for his English proclivities. Seeing that mere commerce was without influence to promote a change in chiefs and people—that as in the Calabar, at Brass and Benin, so at Bonny it had made no way against the old cannibal heathenism—one would have thought that a Government still calling itself Christian—the Government of a nation whose legislators begin their daily public duties with prayer, would have availed itself of the Pepples, as a means for gradually introducing a better state of things among a population with which our merchants are largely connected. There were many ways in which we might have strengthened King George's hands, so as to have given him more prestige and favour in the eyes of chiefs and people; the Ja Ja outbreak was an invaluable opportunity. But, instead of this, Consul Livingston has invariably shown a dislike, an opposition, a disrespect, we had almost said a hatred, of King George, that has greatly weakened him, and greatly strengthened the cause of Ja Ja and old heathenism. What the Consul does is supposed, on the West Coast of Africa, to be done by the British Government; and it is indeed greatly to be deplored that in this matter of Ja Ja, as in but too many others, British influence, in the hands of ill-selected Government representatives, has been made to support what is evil, and to

assist in opposing and destroying what is or might be made the instrument of good. Is it strange that we should feel shame and indignation?

THE REV. HENRY JOHNSON AND LAGOS.

THE letter of the Lay Secretary of the Church Missionary Society which we now insert, will, we hope, satisfy the susceptibilities of our Lagos friends. We quite equal them, to say the least possible, in our appreciation of Mr. Johnson; but, as we suggested in our note appended to the Lagos letter of complaint, we could conceive that there might be great difficulties in the way of compliance with the Lagos desire to have him stationed among them. The translation of the Holy Scriptures into the divers African tongues, is a matter of the very highest importance. The difficulty of language in heathen countries meets the devoted missionary at the very first step. The work of translation, never an easy one, presents enormous difficulties where an unwritten language has to be employed; where the translator has first to construct grammatically the language into which he is to translate. Our friends will at once understand that there are comparatively few men fitted by education and talent for such a task, who would care to locate themselves during a protracted period among the interior natives, with the sole object in view of bringing that precious gift to man, the written Word of God, to their knowledge and comprehension. Among the hopes we have entertained for Africa, has been that of Africans educated by the Church and Wesleyan Missionary Societies, endowed with the necessary talents, devoting themselves, after becoming qualified by training, to that great work. The Rev. Henry Johnson is such a man; and West Africa may well hold him in honour and esteem. Since we unsealed the Lagos letter we have heard from him at the Sherbro; and we cannot do better than quote his own words: "I am happy to say that I have succeeded in completing a definite piece of work. The New Testament has been completely translated into the Mende language; I came to the last verse of the last chapter of the last book, on the 25th January. You may well fancy my joy on that occasion. I immediately fell on my knees and thanked Him who has given me the strength and ability for doing such a blessed work." "I have also compiled a Primer and translated Dr. Watts' First Catechism for the use of the children in my vernacular school. After many disappointments, I have succeeded in establishing such a school, which has now ten pupils, who are giving me entire satisfaction in their lessons. They are most wonderfully quick in committing words to memory; and I hope that, should I be well supported, I may be able, in the providence of God, to make something of them." We have a double motive in giving the above extracts—to show how they have affected us, and how we think they will affect others. Before Mr. Johnson was sent out to the Sherbro by the Church Missionary Society, there being then (1869) a vacancy in the Colonial Chaplaincy at Cape Coast, we earnestly recommended him to the then Secretary of State. The chaplaincy had been filled up before our recommendation was received. We were disappointed, because we thought there was a great field for usefulness at Cape Coast for such a man as Mr. Johnson, even as our Lagos friends were disappointed in not having succeeded in their application that he should be sent to labour among them. But in view of the work which he has since accomplished at the Sherbro, where there is so great need, we are induced rather to rejoice that our wishes were then fruitless. We hope our Lagos friends will do the same as regards their unfulfilled desires. Their departed friend, the late Rev. Henry Venn, would certainly have given up Mr. Johnson to them, had there not been so great a work in view as a translation of the Holy Scriptures into Mende. With his rarely-erring judgment he had fixed on our dear friend, Mr. Johnson, to do this work. He has been taken to his rest before it was fully accomplished, yet did he not lose his joy here on earth regarding it. Only two weeks

* This should have appeared in our March number. Mr. Johnson has since arrived in England.—Ed. A.T.

before his death, having heard from Mr. Johnson that his labours on the New Testament were drawing to a close, he wrote, "I praise God, who has given you gifts of inestimable value to the African Church in West Africa at her present crisis," and added, that, after he had again visited England for a while, which he thought it most desirable for him to do, he should long to hear that he had taken up the translation of the Old Testament also into Mende. We can only add to this our hope, that God will spare his life and strengthen him in body and mind for so great a work.

THE GERMAN EXPLORATION PARTY FOR CENTRAL AFRICA.

This party will come from Berlin to England, and embark at Liverpool for the Congo or Loanda. Advice from Berlin state, "The Imperial Government has received a despatch from the Government of Portugal, announcing that a Government steamer has been placed at the disposal of the first members of the expedition."

TRUE STATEMENTS OF THE CAUSE OF LAGOS DISASTERS.—No. II.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE AFRICAN TIMES.

Lagos, March 11, 1873.
Dear Sir,—After perusing the several articles in the English papers (especially the *Manchester Courier*) on the affairs of Lagos, I feel that it is only fair and just to Governor Pope Hennessy that I should relate in your valuable columns a brief history of the cause of differences between the Lagos Government and the Egbas and Ijebus which have caused them to close their trade against Lagos up to this time; and being an African and knowing my countrymen, I think you will agree with me that my statements claim more credence than any which Mr. Charles Leigh Clare (who only wrote from hearsay, and has never been in Lagos) has or can make. Nothing can be more untrue than Mr. Clare's assertion in the *Manchester Courier* that the roads for trade were closed in consequence of the policy of Governor Hennessy, and I am glad to find that it has been contradicted in the same paper as well as in the *African Times*. Now, Mr. Editor, it seems that Captain Glover and his friends are trying to make the British public believe that the Egbas and Ijebus are antagonistic to British presence in Lagos on account of the Slave question, and they go on to argue that if Governor Hennessy's policy was good, why have not the roads been open to trade since June, 1872, to the present time? They forget the fact that a wound which can be inflicted in a moment cannot be healed for a long time. I state it as an indisputable fact which can bear any test of investigation, that Captain Glover, during the period of his administration of the government of this settlement (from 1863 to 1872), managed to inflict such serious political wounds on the minds of the Egbas and Ijebus, that it is surprising he and his friends should expect those wounds to be healed in the very short time in which Governor Hennessy tried to heal them. Happily for Lagos Lord Kimberley sent out Governor Hennessy at the time he did; otherwise I cannot say how serious the state of things in Lagos would have become. Party spirit and tribal feelings were running so high at the time, that it is questionable whether the authorities would have been able to prevent one of the most bitter and destructive civil wars from breaking out within this settlement, beginning in the town of Lagos itself.

I will go on to point out the true cause for which the trade of Lagos was stopped by the Egbas and Ijebus. The manner in which the cession of Lagos was obtained in 1861 made the interior tribes look upon the English with suspicion and distrust, and consider their country in danger of being some day wrested from them. To add to this suspicion and distrust, the first Governor who was sent to rule the newly acquired settlement in 1862 (the late Governor Freeman), set himself up, and acted so loftily in all his communications with Abeokuta, that the Egbas became embittered against him, and he increased this bitter feeling by sending on to Abeokuta in May, 1862) Consul Taylor, whom the British Government sent to reside in Abeokuta, in so unceremonious and off-handed a manner—instead of doing things according to native ideas and customs, by first sending civil and polite messages, and so preparing them to receive him—that the Egbas refused to receive him. They were already made suspicious and distrustful of the English by the Governor's acts towards them, as prior to this Governor Freeman was known to have been sending messages to the Ibadans, with whom they were then at war, by Captain Glover (then commanding Her Majesty's ship *Handy* in these Lagoons), against whom the Egbas entertained bitter feelings for having, during his travels to and from the Niger in previous years, through the Egba territory, forcibly carried away a large

number of Houssas (slaves of the Egbas) to the Niger territory. Instead of trying to remove this feeling by mild and courteous acts and expressions in all his communications, he continued to write imperious, insulting, and threatening letters to the Egbas, telling them in plain language that their country would be taken away from them if they continued to quarrel with the English Government at Lagos. Now I ask, Mr. Editor, were not the Egbas justified in resenting, in the best way possible, expressions such as these? In short, the Egbas remained sour with Lagos. When Governor Freeman left for England, Commodore Wilmot (now Admiral Wilmot), then commanding Her Majesty's naval squadron on the West Coast, came to Lagos, and went up to Abeokuta with the acting Governor, Captain W. R. Mulliner, to try and appease the Egbas, and put matters right again; but immediately on their return to Lagos, and before the good Commodore could do anything, Captain Glover arrived as Lieutenant-Governor; and it is known how much squabbling there was between the Commodore and Captain Glover, because the Commodore could not agree with Captain Glover in his intended policy. Captain Glover's name, for the cause already stated, set the Egbas in fresh rage, as they considered that they were no longer safe. Hence arose all the troubles and annoyances which the Egbas gave to Lagos. Added to this is their having been desired by Captain Glover privately—when he went to their camp at Makun, to treat with them—to come and destroy the town of Ikorodu, to revenge both themselves for Ikorodu having sided with the Ibadans in the war, and Captain Glover for the insolence of the Ikorodus to him when he went to their town in 1862; the Egbas little thinking that it was only a scheme of Captain Glover's to draw them near the Lagoon, and so expose themselves to the fire of rockets and shells which he had prepared for them in aid of the Ikorodus. On that day when he suddenly fired upon them in March, 1865, the Egbas lost over 700 persons killed. Can they be expected ever to forget this act of treachery on Captain Glover's part? This deep wound remained in the minds of the Egbas and continued to rankle in their breasts, so that they determined to drive the white men from their country. This it was that moved them to plunder and drive out the white missionaries from Abeokuta in 1867, when they heard that Captain Glover was placing constables in all the towns along the road from Ebute Metta to Otta. They looked upon it, not as intended to protect the road from lawlessness, which was a pretence, but as an occupying of the country which intervenes between Lagos and the Egba territory, which occupation they looked upon as a preliminary step towards encroaching upon and occupying all their territory; for, said the Egbas, so long as these white men remain among us, so long shall we have endless troubles with Lagos. After this, matters remained quiet, no doubt from some check to further action being sent to Lagos from the Colonial-office. Trade went on, and confidence was beginning to be restored, as many of the old chiefs died in the meantime, and the people began to be interested in lawful commerce; and had Capt. Glover allowed this quietness to continue and not have interfered with the internal policy of the Egbas and Ijebus in their dealings with the Ibadans—their interior and warlike neighbours—the trade of Lagos would have remained undisturbed and flourishing, and all the commercial disasters which have recently taken place would have been unknown. But no! Captain Glover would not have the Egbas and Ijebus do what they think best for their own country's safety. He tried to bully and bribe both Egbas and Ijebus to give open roads to the Ibadans in the beginning of 1871; and because they would not be bribed nor bullied, nor allow him to dictate to them, he prohibited the export from Lagos not only of arms and munitions of war to the Egba and Ijebu territories, but also all sorts of iron, nails, cask-hoops, farming-implements, &c.; at the same time that he got the Ibadans to assist him in frightening the tribes bordering on the eastern side of the Ijebu territory, north-east of Lagos, into opening a road for the Ibadans by which they might obtain supplies of arms and ammunition to strengthen their hands in attacking and fighting the Egbas and Ijebus, and forcibly obtaining the short road to the coast through the Ijebu country. This so irritated the Egbas and Ijebus, that they concluded to stop all trade with Lagos, so that the white man, who was giving them so much trouble and so harassing them, and whose acts were imperilling their safety, should go out of the country. They therefore closed the trade in March, 1872.

Governor Hennessy, in consequence of this state of affairs, came to Lagos in April, 1872, about a month after the roads had been closed; and had he listened only to the artful official statements which were prepared by Captain Glover to explain away and justify his proceedings, as had been done by former Governors and Commissioners who had visited Lagos on similar occasions, Lagos would have been utterly ruined, and by this time there would have been a different tale about Lagos. But fortunately, like a true British statesman, and one who is alive to his duty as the Queen's representative, with clear discernment and sound

judgment, Governor Hennessy looked at both sides of the question. I need not traverse the rest of what he did, for that is already known to you and to your readers; and had the Yoruba party and Captain Glover's friends in Lagos, headed by the Yoruba ex-Chief Police Constable and a few senseless white men with nothing to lose, allowed matters to rest after Captain Glover had left, doubtless the roads would have been opened long ago; but their sending so many false reports to England, and circulating throughout the country a report that Captain Glover will again be sent either to Lagos or as Governor-in-Chief to Sierra Leone, after his supporters shall have beaten Governor Hennessy in Parliament this session, made the Egbas and Ijebus hesitate to open the roads; and in order to gain time to prove whether her Captain Glover will again come to the Coast or not, they have been putting forth the claims of the slave and land question, knowing that there must be delay in communicating with England.

Being now assured on all sides that such is not the case, they begin to show signs of willingness to open the roads. I assure you, Mr. Editor, these interior people, though keen and sensitive, are very harmless, if only the rulers of Lagos would try to foster and encourage commerce, and further the cause of Christianity and civilization; but if we are to be meddlesome with their affairs, and try to make Lagos a forced mighty empire, as Lord Clive made of India, we shall, as you have said with so much truth, have no end of troubles and ultimate ruin; but if Lagos is to become, as, under proper administration she is destined to be, the Liverpool of the West Coast of Africa, let commerce be encouraged by a mild and non-interfering policy, and Lagos, with her wealth, will realize all your most sanguine desires by exercising a moral influence over the vast interior of these parts. Pray let this view be placed continually before the proper authorities, and so help us as you have always been doing.—I remain, yours truly, Vox POPULI.

EAST AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE.

Sir Bartle Frere, we are told, has done something, but it is something that will have very little avail in putting down the odious traffic in the Indian Ocean. "Muscat" has consented to sign "a treaty in which she undertakes to forbid the importation of slaves, and declares free all negroes and other bondsmen hereafter arriving in the territory of Oman. By the provisions of this treaty she likewise agrees to put down all public slave marts, and anyone who may be proved to have imported slaves will be amenable to the law. Similar engagements have also been entered into with the Sheiks at Makullab, on the Sadramount coast. The political resident at Bushire will make all safe on the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf."

We warn our friends not to attach much importance to such treaties.—Ed. Af. Times.

REVIEW.

Slave Catching in the Indian Ocean. By Captain COLOMB, R.N. One Vol., pp. 503. Longman and Co., London.

This book should be read by everyone who feels an interest in the suppression of the East African Slave Trade. Not that it is by any means perfect, for it has very grave defects. There is too much matter only incidentally connected with the work, set forth in the title; and the author has been led into very serious error when he refers to West Africa as affording evidence in support of some of his arguments and propositions, which we expect will meet with severe handling by our anti-Slavery friends. Our own abhorrence of that loathsome thing—the East African Foreign Slave Trade—is so deep and entire, that any attempts to diminish the just indignation aroused by the but-too-well authenticated records of its atrocities, has a painful effect on our mind; and there are such attempts in Captain Colomb's "Slave-Catching in the Indian Ocean." If, therefore, we recommend the book, notwithstanding what we condemn in it, our friends will understand that we regard it as containing something outweighing its demerits. The preliminary matter extends over above 100 pages. It is only at page 112 that our author leaves Bombay on his slave-catching cruise. His notices of the Arab towns and coast extend to page 184. There the real action of the book begins. The author describes five ships appointed to that season's Slave Trade suppression in the Indian Ocean, as being so placed, and having such cruising ground, that they formed what might be called a spider web for entangling the guilty Arab dhows. H.M.S. Dryad, under the command of Captain Colomb, R.N., formed the northern lines of this web; and here the volume becomes one of great interest to those who have at heart the entire suppression of the East African Foreign Slave Trade. Captain Colomb shows all the difficulties in the way of a British naval commander engaged in this duty—difficulties arising in great measure out of the "instructions" which are to govern and limit his action. After seven days' cruising, he determines to lie in ambush under Cape

Isolette, or Ras Madraka, where the Dryad would be concealed from slavers coming north; while there was a good land look-out, about 400 feet high, from which signals could be made to her of approaching dhows. Success attended this arrangement, and the details are exciting. The Dryad visits also Madagascar, Mauritius, and Zanzibar, and the facts detailed are important as bearing on the great question at issue. We postpone our corrections of Captain Colomb's supposed West African facts, because we must notice the just decision to which he has arrived—that the only chance of suppressing the East African Foreign Slave Trade is by forming a released slave settlement on the coast, which may perform there the duty Sierra Leone has performed on the West Coast. We have always felt that there is no other possible course, and Captain Colomb has rendered great service in advocating it. All our anti-Slavery friends should give their attention to this portion of the book. They will see that the trade cannot possibly be repressed by the action of H.M.'s ships of war alone, and that it is necessary to bring a powerful influence to bear on H.M.'s Government, that the other means above pointed out be also adopted. There is, by the way, a curious printer's error in the first line of page 222, where "calavances" are said to be "a sort of bear," instead of a sort of bean. We point this out, as some of our friends might think rice and beans rather a strange cargo for an Arab dhow.

RE THE APPLICATION FROM LAGOS FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF THE REV. H. JOHNSON. TO THE EDITOR OF THE AFRICAN TIMES.

Lagos, March 11, 1873.

Dear Sir,—Allow me to thank you for having helped to elicit a reply to the Memorial from Lagos to the Church Missionary Society. It appears that at the time I wrote to you, a gentleman, at the request of the memorialists, addressed a letter to the Secretary of that respectable body, with a view to ascertain whether the Memorial in question had been received or not.

The following is a copy of the reply to the Memorial, which, it appears, had been addressed to his Excellency Capt. Glover, who headed the Memorial, since June 17, 1871, but somehow or other, no one in Lagos knew of it till the copy was sent through the Mission agents here last month.

The reply is very satisfactory; and had it been known that such a reply was sent, there would have been no necessity for complaining.

I hope, therefore, that it will be seen that the fault was not ours, nor that of that worthy body, the Church Missionary Society.—I am, dear Mr. Editor, yours truly,

Vox POPULI.

Copy of the Reply.

Church Mission House, Salisbury House, June 17, 1871.

My dear Sir,—The Committee have received from Lagos a Memorial signed by your Excellency and various other residents, requesting that the Rev. Henry Johnson, who lately visited the Yoruba Mission, might be appointed to the Educational Department of that Mission at Lagos.

The Committee feel every desire to comply with a request so powerfully supported, but they feel sure that you will recognize the reason which obliges them to decline the request.

Mr. Johnson had two years of special training in England for the work of translating the Holy Scriptures into the Mendi, Vio, and other languages spoken in the countries bordering upon Sierra Leone.

He has already translated a Gospel into Mendi. His powers as a linguist are of a high order, and after nearly seventy years our Sierra Leone Mission has not yet given the Holy Scriptures to the natives in their own tongues.

On this ground the Committee feel that Sierra Leone is the right post for Mr. Johnson, and that his labours should be wholly devoted to linguistic work.—I have, &c.,

HENRY VENN, Hon. Sec. C.M.S.
His Excellency J. H. Glover, &c., Lagos.

MR. HUTTON ON WEST AFRICAN AFFAIRS.

Manchester, February 25, 1873.

To the Directors of the Chamber of Commerce, Manchester. Gentlemen,—The present unsatisfactory state of the trade of the West Coast of Africa induces me to request your immediate and earnest consideration to the condition of the British settlements there, and to the manner in which the commercial interests of this country on that coast are neglected by Her Majesty's Government.

Wherever slavery has existed Her Majesty's Government has ever been eager and the first to avenge at any expense the cause of the poor negro; the mere suspicion of slavery has always brought to the spot one of Her Majesty's ships of war; but

British merchants on the West Coast of Africa are most heavily, arbitrarily, and exorbitantly taxed by Her Majesty's Government to support the officers they send out, and the traders appeal in vain for that protection to their lives and property and for that consideration to their interests to which they have every moral and just claim.

The injustices British traders suffer from this want of protection has most materially weakened their influence over the natives, and in many parts the only evidence of British rule in Western Africa is the presence of the tax-collector.

The British merchants also suffer most grievously from the commercial ignorance and utter incapacity of the officials sent out by the Colonial-office; the improper appointments and the constant and frequent changes made in the Administration are, in fact, the main causes of the present unsatisfactory state of the settlements and of the trade of the West African Coast. When slave trade existed military and naval appointments may have been beneficial; but now, the trade having been extirpated, and a large and valuable commerce having arisen in its place, it has become absolutely necessary to appoint officers who will protect British merchants and foster commercial interests. The trade of the West Coast of Africa has been disregarded by Her Majesty's Government to such an extent that the natives themselves are gradually losing all respect for this country. There is among them also a general and a strong feeling of discontentment, and the undisguised hope that the time has arrived that the settlements should be given back to them to govern as suits themselves.

The West African settlements comprise Sierra Leone, Gambia, the Gold Coast, and Lagos. Sierra Leone has belonged to Great Britain for over eighty years, and is the most considerable of these colonies, and the centre of government of the whole Coast. Gambia, the Gold Coast, and Lagos were in 1866 placed under the Governor of Sierra Leone, much against their wishes and their interests, and it is the government and welfare of these three smaller possessions which have been the most neglected. For nearly 300 years English merchants have been trading in Gambia, which is the nearest colony to the mother country. The annual imports during the last ten years have averaged 127,000*l.*, and the exports 155,000*l.* The annual revenue is raised by import and export duties, and amounts to 18,000*l.*, out of which sum over 6,000*l.* is paid in salaries to the Governor and about 25 civil officers appointed by the Colonial-office. The principal grievance of the merchants resident there is that the Imperial Government appoints all the officers, taxes them heavily to pay the official salaries, and affords no protection whatever against the surrounding native tribes. There is a Legislative Council appointed by the Crown, but only one merchant is a member, whose presence is tantamount to being useless when opposed to the opinions of the Government officials. The Gambia merchants complain that in 1870, after attempting to dispose of this colony, the Imperial Government withdrew all the troops, and ever since they have been denuded of all means of defending themselves; and although the Home Government has been appealed to for help, not even a gunboat has visited the colony during the last 16 months, and the colony itself has been compelled lately to arrange for the purchase of a small armed steamer to run up and down the river. Serious disturbances have recently broken out among the natives on British territory, and the natives having threatened an attack upon Bathurst—the seat of the Government—this colony has been compelled to obtain aid from the French Government, and to get their town garrisoned by French troops, and the harbour protected by a French war vessel.

The colonists also complain that they have now no direct mail communication with this country, and that they are compelled to contribute 1,000*l.* per annum towards the useless maintenance of a small steamer running once a month to Sierra Leone, 500 miles further down the Coast. During the last five years there have been in Gambia five different Governors or acting Governors. The present Governor was appointed in October, 1871, at a salary of 1,300*l.* per annum; he has held his appointment eighteen months, out of which time only seven months have been spent by him in the colony.

The Gold Coast settlements have belonged to England for 120 years, and until 1843 the government was satisfactorily administered by a company of merchants, and was then taken over by the Crown. The British jurisdiction extends over a territory of about 6,000 square inches, and a population computed at about 275,000 natives. The trade of the Gold Coast has doubled during the last ten years. In 1871, the imports, according to the Gold Coast Customs returns, amounted to 250,000*l.*, and the exports to 378,000*l.*; but according to the British Customs Blue Book, the exports from this country alone amounted to 477,000*l.* The annual revenue which, until 1867, amounted to about 10,000*l.*, reached 30,000*l.* in 1870. There are at present an Administrator receiving 1,500*l.* per annum, and about fifty civil officers whose salaries, amounting to 8,500*l.*, are paid out of the taxes.

The merchants on the Goli Coast ask for similar protection to their trade to that on the Gambia, and that competent officers should be sent out to frame and administer the laws. They complain bitterly of the ordinances passed by the Council in which only one of their members has a voice. The bankruptcy laws favour the dishonest native trader, who evades his creditors by going into the bush. The Customs ordinances are most grievous—they have been framed by men who know nothing whatever of the trade. For some time no bonded stores were allowed on the Gold Coast, and these British settlements, which might have been used as central depôts, as security and for extending trade, were rendered useless for this purpose.

[The residue of Mr. Hutton's Letter (and Mr. Hutchinson's Letter) in our next.]

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